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NO MORE THAN SIMPLE
JUSTICE: ASSESSING THE ROYAL
COMMISSION REPORT ON
WOMEN, POVERTY AND
THE FAMILY
Erika Abner, Mary Jane Mossman and Elizabeth Pickett*
The Report of the Royal Commission on
the Status of Women in Canada identified
barriers to opportunitiesfor women in a
number of different contexts, and made
recommendations for changes to improve
opportunitiesfor women and to ameliorate
their problems. In reviewing the Report's
chapters on Family (ChapterIV) and Poverty (Chapter VI), this article assesses its
underlying assumptions in the lives of
women and men in Canada, and suggests
a need to reassess more carefully the
usefulness of legal strategies and the impact offamily ideologies in designingfeminist objectives for the 1990. Although the
article is critical of the Report because of
its failure to question such underlying assumptions, there is also recognition of the
Report's significant contribution in identifing the issues and in encouraging dialogue about equality objectivesfor women
and the appropriate means of achieving
them.

Le Rapport de ]a Commission royale d'enquete sur la situation de la femme au
Canada a identifij des entraves aux possibilits des femmes dans diffirents
contextes et recommandJdes changements
pour amdliorerles chances desfemmes et
amoindrirleurs problemes. Au moyen d'une
6tude des chapitres sur la famille (chapitre IV) et la pauvrete (chapitre VI), cet
article examine les prisomptions sous-jacentes du Rapport sur la vie des Canadiennes et des Canadiens et indique qu'il
est ndcessaire, pour l'laboration des objectifs f~ministes des ann~es 1990, de
rjexaminer plus attentivement ' utilitj des
stratigiesjuridiques et l'impact des idjologies concernant la famille. Bien que
Particlecritique le Rapport parce qu'il ne
remet pas en question ces prsomptions
sous-jacentes, il reconnait igalement l'importante contribution du Rapport qui a
identifi6 les problemes et suscit6 le dialogue sur les objectifs d'ggalitg pour les
femmes et les moyens appropriks pour les
atteindre.

* Erika Abner received the LL.M. degree at Osgoode Hall Law School in 1989 and
is currently a member of faculty for the Bar Admission Course, Law Society of
Upper Canada; Mary Jane Mossman is a Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School;
and Elizabeth Pickett received the LL.M. degree at Osgoode Hall Law School in
1989 and is currently writing a book on family support. The support and technical
assistance of Hazel Pollack in preparing this paper is warmly acknowledged.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The disjunction between what can be and what is has been the driving
force of western civilization for as long as we have a collective memory.
That women's dissatisfaction was eventually focused into a movement to
change their status brings us back to where we began: the urge to hear
the voices of our female ancestors who have so long been considered
unworthy of being heard.'

This statement about the diaries and letters of women in Nova
Scotia from as early as 1771 neatly captures the spirit of the REPORT
OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN CANADA
two centuries later in 1970.2 Like the earlier diaries and letters, the

similarly identified the need for societal changes concerning
the status of women, and gave moving expression to women's voices,
including both those of the members of the Commission and those
REPORT

who gave testimony before them. 3 In responding to the requirements

of its Terms of Reference "to recommend what steps might be taken
by the Federal Government to ensure for women equal opportunities
with men in all aspects of Canadian society", 4 the Commission issued
167 recommendations and provided women with "a vehicle to express
their aspirations", 5 aspirations characterized as "elementary human
rights and genuine equality". 6 As the REPORT stated in its conclusion:
[Women] require a high degree of resolution to disregard present barriers
and to attain the positions which best reflect their ability. But existing
structures are not sacrosanct: women must be aware that they are entering
a world that can be changed. And men, as they recognize women's claim
to equality, may welcome an opportunity to examine Canada's institutions
in a new light.
In terms of Canada's commitments and the principles on which a de-7
mocracy is based, what we recommend is no more than simple justice.
I M. Conrad, T. Laidlaw & D. Smyth, No PLACE LIKE HOME: DIARIES AND

1771-1938 (Halifax: Formac, 1988) at 305-06.
2 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 28 September 1970) (Chair: F Bird) [here-

LETrERS OF NOVA SCOTIA WOMEN,

inafter REPORT].
3 The Commission was composed of Florence Bird, Chairman [sic], Jacques

Henripin, John P. Humphrey, Lola M. Lange, Jeanne Lapointe, Elsie Gregory MacGill
and Doris Ogilvie. The Executive Secretary was Monique B6gin. See Terms of
Reference and Appendix of the REPORT, ibid.
4 See Terms of Reference of the REPORT, ibid. at vii, which also identified
specific topics for consideration by the Commission, "without restricting the generality" of the broadly-stated mandate, including issues such as laws and practices
concerning political rights, women and the labour force, education and training,
women in the public service, taxation, marriage and divorce, criminal law, and
immigration and citizenship.
5 Ibid. at 3.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. at 393 [emphasis added].
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Twenty years after the REPORT'S publication, it is instructive to assess
its impact on women and men in Canadian society, and the extent to
which its voices, unlike so many of those in the Nova Scotia diaries
from 1771, have been "considered ... worthy of being heard". 8

Such an assessment is, however, not a simple task. It requires us
to revisit the REPORT'S understanding of the issues and its proposed
recommendations, to identify those which have been implemented and
those which remain unaddressed, and to try to evaluate the REPORT in
terms of both its impact and its vision. Implicit in such a task are a
myriad of questions about the assessment process and its criteria. In
relation to recommendations which have been implemented, for example, how can we assess the significance of the Commission's REPORT
in the implementation process, and what are the criteria appropriate to
an assessment of the extent to which recommendations which have
been implemented have been "successful"? Similarly, in relation to
recommendations which have not been implemented, how should we
assess their continued usefulness as well as the reasons for their lack
of "successful" implementation? And, assuming that we can confidently identify "successes" and "failures" in terms of the REPORT'S
recommendations, how should these conclusions influence an overall
assessment of the work of the Royal Commission, either in the context
in which it was produced in 1970 or more recently from a vantage
point in our own time?
Such questions focus attention on the process of social change
and the need to identify clearly the criteria adopted for measuring and
assessing its role and impact. 9 Significantly, both the terms of reference
of the Commission and its recommendations accept (almost without
qualification) a primary role for law and legal changes in achieving
equality objectives for women and men in Canadian society. Especially
in the years since 1970, however, legal scholars have grown more and
more skeptical of the usefulness of law's role in achieving substantive

8 According to Florence Bird, 92% of its recommendations have been wholly
or partially implemented, and she has asserted that "[i]t probably had more of an

impact than any other Royal Commission in history." A. Munter, "1970 Royal
Commission Report Still Debated by Feminists" The Ottawa Citizen (1 November
1990) Al.

9 The nature of social change has been a major focus of concern for legal
academics in recent years, frequently influenced by the concept of paradigm shift in
the work of Thomas Kuhn. See T. Kuhn, THE STRUcTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). See R. Devlin, Twisting
the Tourniquet Around the Pulse of Conventional Legal Wisdom: Jurisprudenceand
Law Reform in the Work of Robert A. Samek (1987) 11 DALHOUSIE L.J. 157, for a
major assessment of law and social change. See also S.- Brickey & E. Comack, The
Role of Law in Social Transformation: Is a Jurisprudenceof Insurgency Possible?
(1987) 2 CAN. J. OF LAW AND SOC. 97.
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social change,o and such scepticism has been even more pronounced
in the context of legal changes to benefit the status of women. Indeed,
Carol Smart has characterized the relationship of women to law reform
in the decades since World War II as "running hard to stand still","
reflecting both the enormous amount of law reform activity and the
paucity of substantive gains for women which have been thereby
accomplished. In such a context, the need to assess the REPORT'S
success in terms of the relationship between legal and social changes
raises profoundly difficult questions about appropriate methodology,
criteria and perspective.
This essay explores some of these questions in the context of
assessing the REPORT'S recommendations concerning "Women and the
Family" (Chapter IV) and "Poverty" (Chapter VI). These topics, and
the REPORT'S treatment of them, offer important insights about the role
of law in achieving social change and its impact on the lives of women
in Canada. The essay begins with an overview of the REPORT'S
recommendations on the issues of family and poverty in the context
of an assessment of the REPORT'S assumptions about the nature of law
and social change. This context provides the basis for a more extended
critique of the REPORT'S conclusions in relation to 1) the limits of
legal and constitutional principles for assisting poor women, and 2)
the pervasiveness of ideology in family law reform, particularly in
relation to "new" procedures for resolving family disputes. From these
perspectives, it is possible to begin an analysis of the REPORT'S
conclusions and to assess its accomplishments, both in terms of its
vision in 1970 and in terms of the tasks which remain for us twenty
years later.

10See, e.g., J.F. Handler, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (New York: Academic Press, 1978);
A. Watson, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1985); and A.E.-S. Tay & E. Kamenka, eds, LAW-MAKING IN AUSTRALIA (Melbourne: Edward Arnold, 1980).
1 Feminism and Law: Some Problems of Analysis and Strategy (1986) 14
INT'L J. OF SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 109 at 116:
It is inaccurate to assert that nothing has changed to improve the position
of women. Equally there has been no linear development of progressive
legislation. Advances in one area (e.g. equal pay) are mitigated by
reactionary measures elsewhere (e.g. employment protection legislation).
Similarly the extension of equal treatment under social security legislation
has occurred at a time when the value of National Insurance Benefits has
been seriously eroded. Finally women's property rights have improved
on condition that they are the primary carers of children, and yet at the
same time there is a growing challenge to women's rights to sole custody
of children on divorce.
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II. WOMEN, POVERTY AND THE FAMILY: THEMES AND CONNECTIONS
A.

Underlying Themes: Equality and the Ideology of Family

The starting point for the Commission's REPORT was the equality
guarantee in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
12

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."
The use of the language of equality was most significant for the
Commission's conceptualizing about the status of women in Canada,
and for the solutions which it eventually proposed. While openly
acknowledging the continued existence of discrimination against women,

and the fact that Canada's espoused commitment to sex equality was
"far from being realized", the Commission's response asserted (in
accordance with its Terms of Reference) that the objective should be
"equality of opportunity for everyone" in Canadian society.13 Not only
did the REPORT adopt the language of equality of opportunity, a concept
frequently criticized since 1970 in terms of equality objectives for
women, 14 but it also used maleness as the standard to which women
should aspire; as the Terms of Reference stated, the Commission's

"to ensure for women equal
task was to make recommendations
5
opportunities with men".'
Yet, despite the adoption of an equality of opportunity goal and
the use of maleness as the standard for comparison, the principles
adopted by the Commission suggested a blend of these objectives,
with some recommendations demonstrating more substantive aspects.
Basically, the Commission adopted four principles: freedom of choice

12 Supra, note 2 at xi. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA
Res. 217A, 3 UN GAOR Pt 1, UN Doe. A/810 (1948). The REPORT explained, at
xi, the impact of this principle as follows:
Canada is, therefore, committed to a principle that permits no distinction
in rights and freedoms between women and men. The principle emphasizes the common status of women and men rather than a separate status
for each sex. The stage has been set for a new society equally enjoyed
and maintained by both sexes.
13 Supra, note 2 at xi.
14See, e.g., M. Eberts, Sex and Equality Rights in A. Bayefsky & M. Eberts,
eds, EQUALITY RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
(Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 183; N.C. Sheppard, Equality, Ideology and Oppression:
Women and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1986) 10 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 195; M.E. Atcheson, et al., WOMEN AND LEGAL ACTION: PRECEDENTS, RESOURCES AND STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on
the Status of Women, 1984); K. Lahey, Feminist Theories of (In)Equality in S.
Martin & K. Mahoney, eds, EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY (Toronto: Carswell,
1987) 71; A.R. Miles, Feminism, Equality and Liberation (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 42.
Is Supra, note 2 at xi and Terms of Reference. The REPORT further suggested,
at xii, that "there should be equality of opportunity to share the responsibilities of
society as well as its privileges and prerogatives" [emphasis in original].
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(about paid workforce participation) for women; shared parenting responsibilities for mothers, fathers and society; special treatment for
women in relation to maternity; and interim special treatment measures
to overcome the adverse effects of discriminatory practices.' 6 The
sharing of parental responsibilities by both mothers and fathers, as
well as society, appeared to be directed to equality of opportunities for
men and women, although it can also be understood as more than an
issue of choice and one which requires revision in societal structures
to be effective. Both the principles of freedom of choice for women
to participate in the paid labour force and recognition of maternity, by
contrast, appeared to be directed to equality in the absence of "sameness", that is, equality of outcome in which maleness may or may not
be the standard. Moreover, the principle of "interim special treatment
measures" to overcome adverse effects of discriminatory practices
represented a departure from equality of opportunity goals and perhaps
also from the maleness standard. Thus, it might be argued that the
four principles adopted by the Commission were not necessarily consistent with its basic goal of equality of opportunity, a concept which
places emphasis on individual effort and which does not take into
account the impact of systemic barriers within societal structures.
Such a conclusion, however, must take account of the context in
which the REPORT was prepared and published. Preceding the sex
equality claims in cases like A.G. Canada v. Lavell' 7 and Bliss v. A.G.
Canada's which interpreted the equality provision of the CanadianBill
of Rights, 19 and also discussion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms20 and its guarantees of sex equality, the REPORT focused on
the identification of practical goals to improve the status of women
rather than a detailed analysis of equality in legal and philosophical
terms. Indeed, it was this highly pragmatic approach to solutions which
(at least in part) led to the lengthy Minority Report of Commissioner
John Humphrey, sternly opposing the concept of compensatory treatment completely and the application of the concept of special treatment
to women. 2' Viewed in this context, it is clear that the REPORT made
16Ibid. at xii.
17 (1973), [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481.
is (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417.
19 S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 1(b), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
20 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
21 REPORT, supra, note 2 at 434-35 and 437-39. With respect to the issue of
special treatment, the Minority Report stated:
The principle, although valid, is open to abuse and can work against the
real interests even of the group which it is meant to protect. Special

treatment for women compared to men comes very near, moreover, to
the protective measures to which so many women object. Whatever their

situation may be in certain under-developed countries, the present condition of women in this country does not, in my opinion, justify recourse
to special treatment.
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an important contribution to the equality debate in the years after 1970,
a debate which continues to the present time to challenge us both in
theory and in practice. In terms of this continuing debate, it is crucial
to assess the extent to which equality goals for women, now guaranteed
in the Constitution, have potential to make further changes in the
status of women in Canada.
The principles enunciated by the Commission also demonstrate
the significance of ideas about the family, and the role of women in
families. Both in its statement of criteria and principles at the outset,
and in relation to individual sections, the REPORT accorded priority to
norms declared by the Universal Declarationof Human Rights and the
U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women. 22 More specifically, the REPORT quoted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights at the beginning of both Chapter IV
(Family) and Chapter VI (Poverty):
The family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is
23
entitled to protection by Society and the State.
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security
in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old
age
24
and other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

While both of the Articles quoted from the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights support the importance and well-being of families, it is
arguable that (in addition to the use of gendered language), they reflect
an acceptance of the norm of a family with a male head-of-thehousehold; and that it is thus the male head-of-the-household for whom
the benefit of family life and freedom from poverty is primarily
provided. Such statements about family life were, of course, quite
prevalent at the time of the REPORT'S publication. Indeed, the 1973
WORKING PAPER ON SOCIAL SECURITY IN CANADA 2 5 similarly reflected
both gendered language and a concept of family which included a
male head-of-the-household. 26 In this context, the REPORT was unremarkable at the same time as it failed to question the role of women
in families.
Yet, there is also some evidence that the Commission recognized
the dichotomy of women's status and their roles within the family

U.N., 1969) at 518.
23 REPORT, supra, note 2 at 225 quoting Article 16.
24 Ibid. at 309 quoting Article 25(1).
2 Canada, Department of Health and Welfare, 2d ed (Ottawa: Supply and
Services, 1973) [hereinafter WORKING PAPER].
26 According to the WORKING PAPER, ibid. at 4-5, Canadians believe that
"each should contribute, to the extent he is able, to his own and his family's wellbeing" [emphasis added].
22 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1967 (New York:
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unit. In acknowledging the poverty of sole-support mothers and of
single elderly women (for whom no male head-of-the-household existed), for example, the REPORT implicitly recognized "families" apparently excluded from the norm created by these international documents. At the same time, however, the REPORT'S focus on measures
to make such poor households more like those which were "normal"
reinforced the basic norm of the family, while obscuring the disparate
economic impact of traditional familial roles on men and women. 27 In
this way, the REPORT'S recommendations failed to question the systemic
barriers created for women by the ideology of the family.
The adoption of equality of opportunity goals and international
law norms espousing the ideology of the family as the fundamental
basis for the Commission's REPORT significantly influenced both its
definition of the problems and the kinds of remedies it proposed. In
the context of family life and poverty issues, moreover, the REPORT
generally failed to note important theoretical connections between
them, a failure which prevented the Commission from considering
proposals dependent on the links between them. In relation to recommendations about "private" re-ordering after divorce, for example, the
REPORT made no connection to its clear recommendation for a guaranteed annual income. To further assess the significance of the REPORT,
therefore, it is necessary to review its recommendations about poverty
and about family life, and then to explore some connections between
these recommendations and the underlying principles of the REPORT.
To this we now turn.
B.

Poverty Issues

The Commission's REPORT recognized poverty as a significant
aspect of women's lives in Canada, although it noted that the situation
of poor women was "an unexpectedly significant finding" in the
Commission's investigation. The Commission concluded that:
(a) probably, in total, more women than men are poor, (b) there are
specific groups of women, such as sole-support mothers, who are extremely poor, and (c) while discrimination and the lack of supporting
social institutions cause hardship among women at all income levels,
28
they cause greatest distress among women who are poor.
27 There has been a large amount of literature on this topic. See, e.g., N.
Mandell & A. Duffy, eds, RECONSTRUCTING THE CANADIAN FAMILY: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988); M. Eichler, FAMILIES IN CANADA ToDAY: RECENT CHANGES AND THEIR POLICY CONSEQUENCES (Toronto: Gage, 1983);
B. Thorne & M. Yalom, eds, RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS
(New York: Longman, 1982); M.A. Glendon, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEW
PROPERTY (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981); L.J. Weitzman, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:
THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

FOR WOMEN AND CHIL-

DREN IN AMERICA (New York: Free Press, 1985); P. McDonald, ed., SETTLING UP

(Sydney: Prentice-Hall of Australia, 1986).
28 REPORT, supra, note 2 at 309.
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This chapter of the REPORT provided an analysis of the nature of
poverty ("Poverty is to be without sufficient money, but it is also to
have little hope for better things. It is a feeling that one is unable to
control one's destiny, that one is powerless in a society that respects
power" 29), and the particular impact of poverty on women, both in
family units and alone. The REPORT also documented the extent and
nature of poverty for three especially vulnerable groups of women:
sole-support mothers, elderly women, and Indian, M6tis and Eskimo
women, in addition to describing poignantly the plight of women in
traditional poor families:
Poverty affects all members of a family, but often it is the wife and
mother who is subject to greatest stress. It is her immediate responsibility
to cope with crowded, inadequate housing and limited budgets. Frequently
she gives priority to the needs of her husband, who must present a
suitable appearance to the outsde world, and to the children, whose
future depends on the care she can give them. Her needs come last, and
she may be the last person in the family to receive medical or dental
new clothing, or to enjoy any recreation or interests outside
care, to have
30
her home.

In such descriptions, the REPORT has arguably given poverty a female
face, one which has not diminished over the past two decades. According to the National Council of Welfare, "[t]he shocking fact ... is

that the proportion of women among Canada's poor" did not change
noticeably in the decade of the 1980s, 31 and that both elderly women
and single-parent families headed by women remained vulnerable to
poverty "for reasons almost totally beyond their control" - child care
labour market inequities, marriage breakdown and
responsibilities,
widowhood. 32
In the face of such developments, it may be significant that the
Royal Commission REPORT in 1970 made only four recommendations
directed specifically to the problem of women and poverty. The REPORT
recommended the establishment of hostels and counselling services for
"transient girls and women" (No. 134); increases in the amount of the
Guaranteed Income Supplement to meet the poverty line, adjusted to
the cost of living index (No. 136); and the establishment or expansion
of friendship centres to provide services to Indian, M6tis and Eskimo
people (No. 137). None of these recommendations challenged systemic
sex discrimination or the basic economic problems faced by poor
women. Only the fourth recommendation - to pay a guaranteed annual
income to heads of one-parent families with dependent children (No.
135) - seemed to be a significant departure from current programs,
29 Ibid. at 311.
30 Ibid. at 313.
31 Canada, National Council of Welfare, WOMEN AND POVERTY REVISITED
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1990) at 1.
32 Ibid. at 2.
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and such a proposal has reappeared more recently in the idea of the
child benefit recommended in33 the report of the Social Assistance
Review Committee in Ontario.
The paucity of recommendations about women and poverty in the
REPORT may appear initially puzzling. According to the Commission,
a concerted effort was made to curtail the number of such recommendations to avoid stigmatization of the poor and to ensure a broad level
34
of public support for services needed by women, rich and poor alike.
Regardless of the merits of such a strategy in 1970, such an approach
must be assessed now in terms of options available to women living
in poverty in Canada and the extent to which other strategies may be
more useful. Such an issue necessarily raises the question of the
significance of the Charter and constitutional litigation as a means of
redressing women's poverty, an issue which is canvassed more fully
below.
C.

Family Issues

The Commission's REPORT identified a larger number of issues
concerning women and family. In relation to marriage, the REPORT
recommended that legislation be enacted establishing 18 years as the
minimum age for marriage (No. 102) and permitting a married woman
to have an independent domicile (No. 105), a passport in her own
name or her married name at her discretion (Nos 103 and 104); and
that the Indian Act 35 be amended so that an Indian woman, on marriage
to a non-Indian, might retain her status and transmit Indian status to
her children (No. 106). Except for the recommendation to raise the
age of marriage, most of these proposals have been implemented,
although not always in just the way envisaged by the Commission. 36
In relation to divorce, the REPORT recommended that divorce be
available following a one-year separation (No. 113) and that provincial
and territorial legislatures establish Family Courts (No. 111) with an
assessment branch dealing with the assessment and payment of alimony
and maintenance (No. 112). The REPORT also recommended legislation
to provide for maintenance of children over 16 years old in relation to
"educational needs" (No. 114) and that ceilings on maintenance awards
be abolished (No. 110). Finally, three recommendations were directed

3- Ontario, Community and Social Services, TRANSITIONS: REPORT OF THE
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE REVIEW COMMITTEE (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988) [hereinafter
TRANSITIONS].
34 REPORT,

supra, note 2 at 33 1.

35 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6. [R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5].
36

See, e.g., H. Penner, BACKGROUND PAPER: BILL C-31, AN ACT TO AMEND

THE INDIAN ACT (Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law, 1988); D.L.

Hawley, THE ANNOTATED 1990 INDIAN ACT (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) for an overview
of the reform of the status of Indian women.
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to achieving equality between spouses through amendments to provin-

cial laws (No. 108) and the federal Criminal Code37 (No. 109) to

ensure that husbands and wives were equally liable to provide support
for a spouse and children, and in relation to matrimonial property. In
relation to the latter issue, Recommendation No. 107 provided:
[W]e recommend that those provinces and territories, which have not
already done so, amend their law in order to recognize the concept of
equal partnership in marriage so that the contribution of each spouse to
the marriage partnership may be acknowledged and that, upon the dissolution of the marriage, each will have a right to an equal share in the
by gift or inheritance
assets accumulated during marriage otherwise than
38
received by either spouse from outside sources.

As is evident in the wording of this recommendation, the REPORT

strongly reinforced the idea of equality within the family unit, apparently without regard to systemic barriers to economic equality for men
and women in society generally. Indeed, while most of the REPORT'S
recommendations concerning arrangements at divorce have been implemented since 1970, the fact that women's poverty has not declined
in the same period raises a serious question about the utility of family
law reform as a means of overcoming systemic inequality in marriage
39
and divorce arrangements.
The REPORT also focused on parental responsibilities in terms of

child care arrangements and reproduction. The recommendations included suggestions about sliding scale fees for day care based on the

means of parents (No. 115). In terms of overall structures, moreover,
the REPORT recommended that provinces pay at least 80% of day care
centre costs (No. 116), that the National Housing Act 4o be amended to
facilitate loans for creating day-care centres, et cetera (No. 117), and

that the federal government and the provinces cooperate in enacting a
national Day-Care Act (No. 118). There was a recommendation for
the creation of provincial Child Care Boards (No. 119) and one
supporting the establishment of an advisory service at National Health

and Welfare (No. 120). In spite of the plethora of recommendations
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 [R.S.C. 1985, c. 46].
Supra, note 2 at 246.
39 Margrit Eichler has commented on the tendency to try to solve the poverty
of divorced women and children through higher support awards and better enforcement, approaches which individualize "what is, in fact a social problem". As she
has suggested:
If, then, further reform of the family law is proposed as a solution to the
problem of female and child poverty, we must ask ourselves what this avoids
doing: namely asking for a comprehensive reform of the income security
system, and of the overall economic structure such that poverty in general
(whether subsequent to a divorce or not) is eradicated.
See C. Schmitz, "Family Law Can't Solve Divorce Poverty?", The Lawyers Weekly
(28 September 1990) 14.
40 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-10 [R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1].
37
38
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in this area, however, there has been a noticeable lack of success in
implementation, at least by contrast with the recommendations concerning arrangements at divorce. Significantly, perhaps, the day-care
recommendations require more fundamental restructuring of family
relations, and as between families and society; by contrast, the divorce
recommendations treat the members of family units as individuals. In
such a context, serious questions must be raised about the nature of
families and the roles of family members, particularly women.
This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of the recommendations concerning reproduction. While the REPORT suggested a
need for systematic and accessible birth control information (Nos 121
and 122) and family planning services (No. 123) and for amendments
to permit sterilization (Nos 124 and 125), it also made clear recommendations for women's choices in relation to abortion:
[W]e recommend that the Criminal Code be amended to permit abortion
by a qualified medical practitioner on the sole request of any woman
who has been pregnant for 12 weeks or less;
[W]e recommend that the Criminal Code be amended to permit abortion
by a qualified practitioner at the request of a woman pregnant for more
than 12 weeks if the doctor is convinced that the continuation of the
pregnancy would endanger the physical or mental health of the woman,
born, it would be
or if there is a substantial risk that if the child were
4
greatly handicapped, either mentally or physically. '

The failure to implement the REPORT's recommendations concerning
abortion arguably reinforces the extent to which these recommendations
challenged family ideology, and the role of women in family units.
Moreover, the recommendations concerning sole-support parents, suggesting a need for community supports (No. 128) and the abolition of
affiliation orders in providing entitlement to welfare (No. 129), might
be seen as strengthening the rationale for state control of abortion as
it confirms "familial" units, albeit without a male head-of-the-household. In the context of these recommendations, and as part of the
process of assessing their relative "success" or "failure", it is thus
critical to explore the nature of family ideology and its impact on the
process and substance of reform efforts.
This critique of the REPORT'S chapters on poverty and family,
therefore, focuses on two underlying elements of these chapters: the
limits of equality litigation in the context of women and poverty, and
the nature of family ideology in shaping the roles and expectations for

men and women in family life. In exploring these themes, moreover,
41 Supra, note 2 at 286-87. Note that there were a number of "Separate
Statements" appended to the REPORT. For dissenting views, see J. Henripin, at 42223, and D. Ogilvie, at 431. See also E.G. MacGill, at 429, who suggests that
"abortion should no longer be regarded as a criminal offense but as a private medical

matter between patient and doctor".
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the connections between them, and the relationships between issues of
poverty and of family for women will also become more evident. In
this way, we hope to suggest how our future efforts to change the
status of women -

"no more than simple justice" -

may be accom-

plished.
III. WOMEN, POVERTY AND THE FAMILY: RE-THINKING
THE CONTEXT

A.

Poverty and the Limits of Equality Theory

The Royal Commission's REPORT and recommendations focused
on a commitment to equality of opportunity and change through law.
After identifying the factors which contribute to the phenomenon of
women's poverty, the commissioners theorized that it would be possible
to change these factors through active legal intervention. However,
there is increasing and compelling evidence that women's poverty has
not decreased in the intervening twenty years; rather, it has increased.
Was the Commission fundamentally misguided in its approach? Has
equality of opportunity been tried and found wanting? Has change
through law been tried and found wanting? Why, in spite of all our
good intentions, is women's poverty and their children's poverty on
the increase?
Any examination of the nature of women's poverty must begin
with an analysis of the broad issue of women's access to money. In
our society, there are three means for women to obtain money: longterm state assistance, marriage to a breadwinner spouse, and paid
employment. 42 The REPORT addressed the need for long-term state
assistance by recommending a guaranteed annual income; this recommendation has remained unimplemented. 43 The REPORT made numerous
recommendations respecting women's employment; many of these have
now been implemented. However, as will be discussed below, these
changes have not made a significant difference to the material condition
of women's lives.
This section of the paper analyzes why the REPORT'S recommendations have failed to produce significant change, by examining the
process of change through constitutional litigation. It is appropriate to
focus on this particular attempt at "change through law" both because
constitutional challenges have been presented to women as a potent
source of change, and because the equality rights provisions of the

42 T.S. Dahl, WOMEN'S LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
(London: Oxford University Press, 1987) at 111-29.
43 Families with children receive small amounts through the income tax system
in the form of refundable and non-refundable child tax credits.
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Constitution directly engage the question of the efficacy of a vision of
equality of opportunity.
This section of the paper suggests that attempts to change the
material conditions of women's lives through constitutional challenges
are likely to produce minimal results. The results will be minimal
because constitutional challenges will produce very few results along
two of the three critical axes of women's access to money: employment
and government transfers. Any change on the employment axis will
be limited because of the difficulty inherent in the public/private
distinction and because of the courts' difficulty in fashioning appropriate remedies. Any change on the transfer axis will be limited because
of the difficulty in fashioning an appropriate remedy and because of
the courts' definition of equality. Moreover, on both axes, any remedy
is necessarily limited by a definition of equality of opportunity which
adopts a male model with respect to the distribution of societal goods.
1.

StatisticalEvidence of Change: One Step Forward and Two
Steps Back

Poverty can be analyzed in several different ways. The first is to
determine the measurement of poverty, in other words the line under
which a person's or family's income qualifies them as poor.44 The
second is by raw statistical data: how many people or families are
poor, by categories which include sex, age, number of children,
geographical location, and employment status. (The poor may be
classified as being either the working poor or the non-working poor).
Third, it may be analyzed by an examination of the depth of poverty,
in other words how long a period any one person or family remains
poor and how often that person or family cycles between poverty and
non-poverty. Finally, it may be analyzed by an examination of the
poverty gap, that is, the amount needed to bring a person or family
up to the poverty line.
All indicators suggest that single women with children face a
substantial risk of poverty. Four in ten female-headed families are poor,
compared to one in ten male-headed families. 45 Women make up a
larger proportion of the low-income population than of the population
as a whole. The greatest percentage of poor children under the age of
16 (61.8%) live in a female-headed family.46 The number of singleparent families in Ontario has grown significantly in the past 20 years;
4 See D.P. Ross & R. Shillington, THE CANADIAN FAcT BOOK ON POVERTY
1989 (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1989) [hereinafter FACT BOOK
ON POVERTY] for a discussion of the different ways of measuring poverty. For the
purpose of our analysis the method of measurement is not important.
45 National Council of Welfare, POVERTY PROFILE 1988 (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1988) at 19 [hereinafter POVERTY PROFILE].
46 Ibid. at 28.

Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa

[Vol. 22:3

from 1969 to 1987 they increased by 241%, and from 1981-87 they
increased by 41%. They are the next largest single poor group, after
the disabled, and they have grown faster than any other part of the
provincial welfare caseload. 47 The number of poor female-headed single
parent families in Canada has grown from 19% in 1973 to 27% in
1986. 48
There is very little information on the depth of poverty or on the
circumstances which lift people out of poverty. TRANSITIONS, the report
of the Social Assistance Review Committee, noted that the average
length of time spent on social assistance by employable recipients was
about seven months; single parents, by contrast, averaged three to four
years. 49 However, single mothers were more than twice as likely to
return to benefits as were disabled persons - the report noted a 27%
recidivism rate, which appeared to be increasing.50 Thus, while we
can speculate on the ways in which people can lift themselves above
the poverty line, there is very little hard data which demonstrates how
they do so.
Finally, an examination of the poverty gap reveals that femaleheaded single-parent families in 1986 recorded the largest poverty gap.
They were closely followed by two-parent families. The elderly had
the smallest gap.5 ' All of the above tends to indicate that women and
their children bear a substantial risk of becoming poor, of being very
poor, and of finding great difficulty in lifting themselves from poverty.
Taking into account our perception of these problems in the 1990s, let
us turn to the recommendations of the REPORT.
2.

Why Are Women Poor?

The Commission identified a number of factors which contributed
to women's poverty. These included lower levels of education for
women generally, poorer health (in particular, the effects of childbearing on women), housing, and lack of employment. These were identified as a treadmill for women:
[T]here is a strong inter-relationship between many of these aspects of
poverty. Each contributes to the next: the lack of education to the lack
of a job; the lack of a job to poor housing and ill health.5 2
47 TRANSITIONS, supra, note 33 at 30-31 and 37.
4s FACT BOOK ON POVERTY, supra, note 44 at 46.
49 Supra, note 33 at 32. "[Flor the majority of recipients, social assistance

fills a temporary need in response to a particular life crisis", ibid. at 35. Unfortunately,
we don't know where women go; however, we do know that they constitute a

significant proportion of the working poor. See ibid. at 263-65 for further discussion
of the length of time spent in poverty.
50 Ibid. at 264. For a thorough descriptive analysis of this issue, see P.M.
Evans, A DECADE OFCHANGE: THEFBA CASELOAD, 1975-86, RESEARCH DOCUMENT No.

42 (Toronto: Social Assistance Review Committee, 1987).
51 FACT BOOK ON POVERTY, supra, note 44 at 54.
52 REPORT, supra, note 2 at 319.
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The REPORT'S analysis is similar to that of the Canadian Council
on Social Development, which identified a critical link between poor
education and low income: "[N]othing more sharply distinguishes poor
households from non-poor households than their respective levels of
education". 53 Significantly, however, the Council's report also identified
both job creation and wages and conditions of work as essential features
of an effective anti-poverty policy. Ross and Shillington focused on
two factors in particular; "the inability of employment growth to keep
pace with new household formation" and the poor performance of
minimum wages across the country.54 Thus, there are simply not
enough jobs to go around, and those jobs which pay only the minimum
wage will not lift a family out of poverty. However, the FACT BOOK
ON POVERTY concluded that an anti-poverty strategy should not focus
on reducing government transfers; without transfers, the depth of
55
poverty would be considerably greater.
By contrast, the REPORT did not address the effect of market
forces on the creation of women's poverty. To the extent that it did
so, it assumed that change through law would substantially improve
women's position within the work force. For the REPORT, poverty was
an individual phenomenon, not a matter of structural inequity. In this
context, it is appropriate to turn to the issue of employment to see if
women's position in the labour market has changed and, if so, how.
3.

Women and the Labour Force

At least in 1990, it may be important to consider what sorts of
employment opportunities are available to women who want to escape
the poverty trap. All the available evidence indicates that women's
employment is characterized by a very high degree of job "ghettoization" and low pay. 56 Women are still concentrated in the low-paid,
unattractive jobs where productivity and recognized skills tend to be
low. 57 As a cheap and flexible labour pool, therefore, women workers
58
are essential to the economic structure.
Moreover, this pattern has not changed despite very significant
shifts in the kinds of jobs being created. In examining the majority of
new jobs created during the period 1975-80, for example, Pat and
Hugh Armstrong concluded that there was still significant occupational
segregation, to the point that women competed with women and men

53 FACT BOOK ON POVERTY, supra, note 44 at 92.

Ibid. at 91.
55 Ibid.
56 See P. Armstrong & H. Armstrong, THE DOUBLE GHETTO: CANADIAN
WOMEN AND THEIR SEGREGATED WORK, rev'd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1984) c. 2.
57 Ibid. at 201.
54

58 Ibid. at 202.
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with men. Further, service work accounted for a high percentage of
part-time jobs for women; part-time jobs were increasingly found in
those industries where women were concentrated, and the demand for
women workers, especially part-time workers, continued to increase.
Moreover, there was a tendency for full-time jobs to be created in
occupations where men worked while
part-time jobs were created in
occupations where women worked.5 9
How do these patterns affect poor women and, in particular,
women who have fallen into the social-assistance safety net? "There
is abundant evidence which suggests that single mothers, before, during
and following periods of social assistance, work in jobs which are
60
badly paid, unstable and offer little chance for career advancement."
Indeed, there is some evidence that the recent and vast growth in the
service sector in the United States is directly attributable to the
availability of poor women, who form a labour force "continually
endowed with marginal characteristics". 6' The jobs available to women
are incompatible with the eradication of economic dependence and
industries "most responsible for employment growth pay a wage rate
that absolutely requires the recipient of those wages to find additional
resources in order to support a family above the poverty level". 62
Taking account of all these factors, Pat and Hugh Armstrong concluded
that:
[W]omen workers are essential to the economic structure in that desegregation of the labour force would require fundamental changes in those
sectors that rely on a cheap and/or flexible labour force supply. It is
therefore in the interest of many employers to maintain the division of
63
labour by sex.

Consider again the interrelationship between market forces and
poverty. In Canada, a fully employed minimum-wage worker with a
spouse and child in a large city would earn, in 1986, only 46% of the
poverty-line income. Even if both spouses worked at minimum wage,
they would earn only 92% of the poverty-line income.64 While it is
unclear how many women receive minimum wage, there is very strong

59P. Armstrong & H. Armstrong, A WORKING MAJORITY: WHAT WOMEN
MUST DO FOR PAY (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1983) at 233-41.
60 P.M. Evans & E.L. McIntyre, Welfare, Work Incentives, and the Single

Mother: An Interprovincial Comparison in J. Ismael, ed., THE CANADIAN WELFARE
STATE: EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1987)
101 at 115.
61 J. Smith, THE PARADOX OF WOMEN'S POVERTY: WAGE-EARNING WOMEN
AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION in B. Gelpi, N.C.M. Hartsock, C.C. Novak et al,
eds, WOMEN AND POVERTY (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986) 121
at 130.
62 Ibid. at 137.
63 Supra, note 56 at 201-02.
64 FACT BOOK ON POVERTY, supra, note 44 at 91.
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evidence that women are concentrated in low-wage industries and parttime work, areas where minimum-wage levels are likely to be quite
prevalent. Thus, real change to the material conditions of women's
lives would require substantial restructuring of the conditions of women's waged work.
The point of this analysis is that the changes in the pattern of
women's employment in the past twenty years have not been "successful" in changing women's poverty. Despite the enactment and
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and other measures to encourage women's meaningful participation in the workforce, women have
not been able to find relief from poverty in employment.
4.

The Equality Dimension: the Public/PrivateDistinction and
Remedial Power

Can the factors which create or perpetuate women's poverty be
changed through constitutional litigation? Can these factors be changed
through a reliance on equality doctrine generally and equality of
opportunity more specifically? In the context of paid employment and
government transfers, this analysis offers a pessimistic answer to these
questions. There are essentially three reasons for this pessimism. Two
are structural reasons flowing from the very nature of the Charter: the
public/private distinction and the limited remedies which courts are
prepared to fashion. The third reason is ideological and is embedded
in the problems created by a reliance on the idea of equality of
opportunity.
Section 32 provides that the Charter applies both to the Parliament
and government of Canada and to the legislature and government of
each province. This has generally been interpreted to include legislation, regulations and administrative activity by government. There is
still a grey area where it is unclear whether the Charter applies to
non-governmental agencies which receive government funds and to
activity which appears private on its face but which is governed by
common law jurisprudence. But if we consider again the problems
women face in the labour force, it is clear that a court would be asked
to order one or all of the following: 1) more full-time jobs, 2) better
wages and conditions of work, 3) a higher minimum wage, and 4)
fewer women in the service sector (or alternatively, service-sector
employment which is stable and provides a wage sufficient to lift a
family out of poverty). Given that any of these matters (with the
possible but unlikely exception of the minimum wage) are clearly
private and outside the scope of the Charter, it is unlikely that any
would even reach a court for consideration. Thus, one avenue for
change, the constitutional challenge, remains closed to women. 65
65 For more extensive discussion on the public/private distinction, see J. Fudge,
The PubliclPrivate Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of
Charter Litigation to FurtherFeminist Struggles (1987) 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 485.
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Even in those circumstances where courts are prepared to make
decisions (that is, where a matter is clearly in the public realm), they
have not exercised broad remedial powers. These cases include those
where citizens have challenged their access to government benefits,
where citizens have asked the courts to relieve a disadvantage occasioned by impecuniosity or where the courts have been asked to create
a new category of beneficiary under particular legislation. 66 While the
courts have in two cases required the government to extend benefits
to new categories of recipients, they have generally been unwilling to
require government expenditure to support the goals of a social welfare
state. 67 This ideology is best summarized in R. v. King: "Public funding

of day-care facilities is a social problem which is beyond the reach of
the court." 68 If such a social program, so critical to women's access
to money, is beyond the reach of the courts, there is a demonstrable

limitation on the efficacy of constitutional litigation on behalf of
women.
5.

Equality of Opportunity

What is equality of opportunity? Why does adherence to a vision
of equality of opportunity mean so little for women? What kind of
equality would satisfy the needs of this particular disadvantaged group?
What would it look like in concrete terms, not in the abstract? Our

focus thus moves from structural questions concerning the possibilities
of constitutional litigation to the application of theories of equality to

the distribution of societal goods. Walzer has identified a number of
social goods to be distributed, which may include membership in
society, security and welfare, education, free time, and hard work. He
argues that there is no a priori method of distribution of such goods:

66 See, e.g., Bregman v. A.G. Canada (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 409, 33 D.L.R.
(4th) 477 (C.A.), where the Court refused to create a new category of persons eligible
for benefits under the War Veteran's Allowance Act; and Reference Re Family Benefits
Act (N.S.), Section 5 (1986), 75 N.S.R. (2d) 338, 26 C.R.R. 336 (C.A.), where the
Court upheld a challenge to the section of the Act which provided benefits to women
but not to men.
67 These two cases are Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (1988), 88 N.R. 6, 23 C.C.E.L. 103 (F.C.A.), where the Court
held that the section of the Unemployment Insurance Act which disentitled persons
over the age of 65 from receiving benefits was of no force or effect; and Schachter
v. Canada (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 525, 20 C.C.E.L. 301 (EC.T.D.), aff-d [1990]
2 RC. 129, 66 D.L.R (4th) 635 (C.A.), where the Trial Court issued (and the Appeal
Court upheld) a declaration which effectively extended certain benefits to natural
fathers.
68 (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 768 at 774, 50 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (C.A.). This case
involved a prosecution of a day care for failure to obtain a license. The parents
argued that they were thoroughly satisfied with the service provided, and that there
were few day care services available to them. The Court dismissed the appellant's
appeal from conviction.
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"[D]ifferent social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons,
in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that
all these differences derive from different understandings of the social
goods themselves
- the inevitable product of historical and cultural
particularism". 69
Equality of opportunity has been defined as the assertion that
"each man should have equal rights and opportunities to develop his
own talents and virtues and that there should be equal rewards for
equal performances". 70 The concept of equality of opportunity has
often been described in terms of a race: everyone is able to line up at
the race of life, without impediment, and the best man wins. Contrast
this theory with equality of result, which is clear: everyone gets the
same distribution of the goods at issue.
However, as Schaar points out, the formula for equality of opportunity is more accurately described as: "[E]quality of opportunity
for all to develop those talents which are highly valued by a given
people at a given time ... [C]ommitment to the formula implies prior

acceptance of an already established social-moral order". 7' Thus, equality of opportunity carries with it its own limitations: it allows and even
promotes the continuation of substantial and powerful inequalities
because the state is not expected to provide equality of opportunity
where the skills at issue are not highly valued. This is the crux of the
dilemma which women face: the social-moral order accepts that the
"hard work" which women typically perform is not valued. Thus,
women are not able to develop their talents outside the realm of hard
work, that is, outside the realm of work that is dirty, unpleasant, and
generally shunned. Equality of opportunity offers rewards on a male
model; as very few women are able to take advantage of this model,
very few women receive the rewards which equality of opportunity
purports to offer.
In more concrete terms, the essence of equality for women would
mean that they would face no greater economic liability than would a
man; that they would not experience unjust distributions of money,
time, and work. 72 Such an approach would mean that there would be
a corresponding increase in the amount of "hard work" and decrease
in the amount of leisure time, which men experience. Reliance on
constitutional litigation, therefore, to improve women's position, would
require that judges engage in a wholesale redistribution of societal
resources. These resources would not be limited to money or other
government benefits but would include, for example, leisure time. As

69

M. Walzer,

SPHERES OF JUSTICE

(New York: Basic Books, 1983) at 6.

J. Schaar, Equality of Opportunity and Beyond in J.R. Pennock & J.W.
Chapman, eds, NOMOS IX EQUALITY (New York: Atherton Press, 1967) 228 at 229.
71 Ibid. at 230.
72 See Dahl, supra, note 42 at 182-83.
70
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sympathetic as courts may be to the plight of an impoverished individual, they are unlikely to step out of their institutional role to engage
in a wholesale redistribution of these resources.
B.

Women, Family and Ideology

In the twenty years since the publication of the REPORT, Canada
has witnessed an historically unprecedented flurry of legislative reform
with respect to the laws of marriage, divorce and "the family" at both
the provincial and federal levels. Every province has undertaken at
least one attempt, and in some cases several attempts, to reform
regimes determining the division of property between spouses upon
divorce, the enforcement of child support and maintenance and the
principles of child custody decision-making.73 At the federal level, the
reform of divorce legislation begun in 1968 was extended in 1986 by
the new Divorce Act, 198574 which reduced the grounds for divorce
from a series of "fault-based" circumstances to the ground of breakdown of the marriage, while at the same time lowering the time period
for establishing marital breakdown by reason of separation from three
years to one. Principles for determining spousal support and child
custody and access were also included in this legislative reform.
As has been suggested, the influence of the findings and recommendations of the REPORT on the specific forms of legislative change
in these areas is difficult to determine. However, it is arguable that the
REPORT provided the backdrop (if not the starting point) for Canadian
feminist activism during the past two decades and that it reflected the
predominant use of liberal feminist concepts in providing theoretical
underpinnings for an agenda of feminist reform. In such a context, the
REPORT is an important part of any process of assessment of the
accomplishments and failures of the "second wave" of feminism in
Canada.
This section focuses on an assessment of the successes or failures
of the REPORT'S analysis and recommendations with respect to women
and the "family", particularly in the context of marriage and divorce.
It is suggested that unexamined assumptions and theoretical shortcomings found in the REPORT led to the formulation of recommendations
which, in some cases, did little to improve the substantive conditions
of the lives of Canadian women and which, in other cases, have in
fact led to the exacerbation of the difficulties and dilemmas which
women face both within the family during marriage and outside its
traditional confines upon divorce. Although this analysis focuses on

73 For instance, in Ontario, family law legislation has undergone two revisions
since the publication of the REPORT: the Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.
152 and the Family Law Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c. 4.
- S.C. 1986, c. 4.
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the recommendations about divorce, much of it can be applied
to the
75
remaining recommendations of the chapter on the family.
In assessing the historical significance of the document to the
Canadian women's movement, it is necessary to identify and evaluate
the theoretical and ideological perspectives of the REPORT and the
substantive consequences of that perspective for the social and economic position of women and their families in 1990. The goal of such
a process is to understand both the strengths and weaknesses of the
REPORT'S approach, so as to facilitate the development of new feminist
theoretical perspectives and practical agendas for the decades to come.
1.

The Nuclear Family as a Starting Point

Taking as its starting point its Terms of Reference that Canadian
women must be guaranteed "equal opportunities with men in all aspects
of Canadian Society", 76 the REPORT identified and examined difficulties
facing women within traditional and "transitional" family structures
during marriage as well as upon the dissolution of marriage. At the
outset, the REPORT identified the "family" as a unit of social organization which functions "in every known culture ... to meet the basic

human needs of the individual", 77 also acknowledging, however, that
these basic human needs can be met in "[n]ew family styles and
patterns". 78 Nonetheless, the REPORT assumed throughout, both implicitly and explicitly, that the dominant and perhaps most appropriate
family form for meeting these needs is the nuclear family, a unit most
often understood to comprise a husband and economically dependent
79
wife living with their children, biological or adopted.

The centrality of the nuclear family form in Canadian public
policy was evidenced in the Commission's concern that deviations
from the dominant family form caused personal, social, and economic
difficulties for women and children. As the REPORT noted, for instance,
changing expectations with respect to women's roles within the family,
particularly the rising number of women employed outside the home,
placed women at a disadvantage in terms of prestige and independence
when they chose to work in their homes raising children.80 At the
same time, the REPORT noted that rising divorce rates8 ' were leaving
increasing numbers of women to fend for themselves and their 8children,
"without ever having been prepared for such an eventuality". 2

75

See supra, text accompanying note 12 and following.
note 2 at vii.

76 REPORT, supra,
77

Ibid. at 225.

78

Ibid. at 226.

79 Ibid.

8o Ibid. at 228-29.
81 Ibid. at 225.
82

Ibid. at 229.
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In the face of such concerns, the REPORT identified the unequal
division of labour within the family as an obstacle to women's equality,
particularly as regards the care of children, concluding that "many
former ways of doing things within the family must change" 8 3 in order
to remove that obstacle. To this end, it proposed that change was
needed "in the laws governing marriage, the mutual obligations of84
husband and wife, and the dissolution of marriage through divorce"
the state exercises over such matters
and further, "in the legal control
as birth control and abortion". 85
2.

Ideas About Equality

In some sense, the REPORT'S recommendations with respect to
marriage and divorce can be understood as specific responses directed
at the two obstacles which the Commission found in the way of
women's equality: personal prestige and economic independence. Recommendations such as those which would allow a woman to obtain
her passport in her own name rather than that of her husband8 6 and to
maintain or acquire independent domicile 7 reflect the former goal,
while those seeking the removal of "ceilings" on child support orders 8s
and the provision of support enforcement services through the Family
Courts,8 9 the latter. As well, in keeping with its stated equality goals
for men and women, the REPORT recommended that legislation should
reflect the "equal partnership" of marriage 90 and hence, that women
their spouses and
who were financially able be required to support
9
children post-divorce on the same terms as men. '
In the context of the 1990s, of course, some of these recommendations reflect fundamentally different kinds of equality objectives:
formal as contrasted to substantive. Moreover, although it is difficult
to assess the success or failure of formal legal changes which have
been implemented in terms of their effect on the "prestige" of women,
it has been the conclusion of many feminist legal commentators that
formal equality is a necessary, but insufficient, step toward the achievement of substantive equality for women. 92 Yet, in its own time, the

83 Ibid.
84 Ibid. at
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid. at
87 Ibid. at
88 Ibid. at
89 Ibid. at

230.
235.
237.
251.
252.

90 Ibid. at 246.
9, Ibid. at 249.
92 See, e.g., A.R. Miles, Feminism, Equality, and Liberation (1985) 1 C.J.W.L.
42, especially at 64-68.
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Commission's attempts to enhance women's status with such recommendations should not be ignored since it is clear that there was some
recognition that such achievements must be accompanied by substantive
goals. In such a context, however, an assessment of the value of the
substantive changes recommended is infinitely more difficult. For, even
though a number of the REPORT'S recommendations for substantive
equality have been implemented over the past two decades, the puzzling fact is that they have not often led to the results expected by the
Commission and by women in Canada who have pressed so hard for
their implementation.
For instance, to the extent that the relative poverty of women and
their dependent children upon divorce was identified as a problem by
the REPORT, it is not at all clear that support enforcement has provided
a resolution, even in those provinces which have enacted legislation
of the kind envisaged by the REPORT. 93 Although such legislation has
effected some improvement in the number of women who actually
receive court-ordered child support from fathers,94 the 1980s have
nevertheless witnessed a seemingly inexorable march into poverty for
single women who are the heads of families; a significant proportion95
of these women have been cast into poverty following divorce.
Overall, there is evidence that the experience of Canadian women and
men at divorce is not unlike the pattern identified in United States

93 See M. Eichler, FAMILIES IN CANADA TODAY: RECENT CHANGES AND THEIR
POLICY CONSEQUENCES, 2d ed. (Toronto: Gage, 1986) at 371, where the author points
out that support-enforcement legislation will not "solve the problem of financial need
when payments are simply too low to allow one to live in dignity". Eichler also
points out at 370 that:
[O]ne study which looked at recently separated mothers from the Hamilton-Wentworth, Burlington, and Brantford area found that of those cases
in which husbands had been ordered by the court or had committed
themselves to make payments (the highest percentage reached was 73
percent), 38 percent had agreed to pay or been ordered to pay between

$1 and $99 for one child per month, and another 42 percent were
committed to between $100 and $149 (i.e., 80 percent of those fathers

who were committed to pay paid less than $150 per month for a child
in 1978)... Another study found that in British Columbia, monthly awards
made between 1976 and 1978 averaged approximately $71 per month.
9 Ibid. at 370.

95 Ibid. at 248-49.
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research: women experience a 73% decrease in their 96standard of living
post-divorce, while men experience a 42% increase.
This outcome is, to some extent, the result of child support orders

which do not fully meet the needs of sole support mothers. However,
the economic problems of women with dependent children now seem
so profound that it is no longer possible to expect that they will be97
resolved merely by tapping the pocketbooks of individual men.
Employment structures in which women are "ghettoized" into lowpaying jobs, the demands of the "double shift" of employment and
child care which often force women into part-time work or prevent
career advancement, and the apparent intractability of the problem of
lower pay for women even when they do the same work as men, are

but a few of the factors which cannot be resolved by higher child
support payments and strict enforcement procedures. 98
Principles of equality and gender neutrality such as those advocated by the REPORT with respect to mutual spousal support obligations

and the recognition of marriage as an equal partnership did, in fact,
find their way into "family" legislation in the 1980s. For instance, the
preamble to Ontario's Family Law Act, 1986 states:
Whereas it is desirable to encourage and strengthen the role of the family;
and whereas for that purpose it is necessary to recognize the equal
position of spouses as individuals within marriage and to recognize
marriage as a form of partnership; and whereas in support of such
recognition it is necessary to provide in law for the orderly and equitable
settlement of the affairs of the spouses upon the breakdown of the
partnership, and to provide for other mutual obligations in family relationships, including the equitable sharing by parents of responsibility for
their children. 99

96 Extensive Canadian data is not available currently. However, Eichler, ibid.
at 249 points out that:
[S]mall-scale studies suggest that the situation in Canada is quite comparable. Manitoba is widely regarded as the province with the best
enforcement maintenance payments. (This may change with the coming
into force of federal enforcement legislation.) A study conducted by the
Manitoba Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1985) documents
the results of maintenance decisions in 1981 and in 1983-1984 in that
province. It demonstrates gross inequities similar to those found in
California. Richardson (forthcoming) notes that 95 percent of femaleheaded solo-parent families in New Brunswick are receiving social assistance. On the basis of the knowledge that is presently available, there is
therefore no reason to believe that the situation in Canada would be better
than the situation in California.
97 See supra, note 39.
98 See, e.g., Eichler, supra, note 93 at 187-226; P. Armstrong, LABOUR PAINS:
WOMEN'S WORK IN CRISIS (Toronto: Women's Press, 1984); Armstrong & Armstrong,
supra, note 59; V. Novarra, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: THE AMBIVALENCE OF

EQUALITY (London: Marion Boyans, 1980); M.A. Mason, THE EQUALITY TRAP (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).
99 S.O. 1986, c. 4.
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This principle of gender equality is, moreover, reflected in various
sections of the Act, including provisions for the equalization of assets
upon separation or divorce and mutual spousal and child support
obligations. As well, the new Divorce Act, 1985, reflects a similar
principle in its provisions for spousal and child maintenance and in
provisions for the determination of child custody. 100 The impact of
such reforms, however, has been far from uniformly positive.
3.

Custody and Support

In the area of child custody, for instance, most legislation assumes
that a child's mother and father are similarly situated ("equal") vis-avis their parenting ability, particularly in terms of employment prospects and abilities, financial power (due to the "equalization" of family
assets) and child-care experience, unless it can be proved otherwise.
However, assuming equality where there is none has in practice led to
the obscuring of the "gender specific realities of family life for men
and women",' 0 ' that is, a higher standard of parenting expected of
women as compared to men 02 and the lower income-earning capacity
of women. 03 Since, historically, less has been expected of men in
terms of parenting, any involvement in childcare on the part of fathers
has often been unduly valued by the courts. As well, when the lower
income-earning capacity of women in general is not considered, a
particular woman's inability to adequately support her children has
been seen as a negative attribute of that woman as compared to the
father. Indeed, a woman's "choice" to work outside the home has
been seen as a lack of commitment to her parenting role, while men's
work commitments remain evidence of dedication to the life of the
family. 104
In the area of spousal support, as well, principles of "equality"
have been utilized to impose time limits on support provided to women
100S.C. 1986, c. 4. See also Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 68,

s. 24(2).
101S.B. Boyd, "From Gender Specificity to Gender Neutrality? Ideologies in
Canadian Child Custody Law" in C. Smart & S. Sevenhuijsen, eds, CHILD CUSTODY
AND THE POLITICS OF GENDER (London: Routledge, 1989) at 126.
102See, e.g., Boyd, ibid. See also L. Girdner, Child Custody Determination:
Ideological Dimensions of a Social Problem in E. Seidman & J. Rappaport, eds,
REDEFINING SOCIAL PROBLEMS (New York: Plenum, 1986) 165.
103 See P. Armstrong & H. Armstrong, Women, Family and Economy in Mandell
& Duffy, eds, supra, note 27, 143 at 163-64:
Although many more [women] are in the labour force, most are still
segregated into women's jobs at women's wages... In 1982, the average
earnings of women who were employed full-time were just 64% of those
of full-time male employees ... If fringe benefits are included, the wage
difference between full-time employed women and men has been increasing...
-o See Girdner, supra, note 102.
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after separation or divorce on the basis that women are equally capable
of supporting themselves and need not remain economically dependent
on their spouses.10 5 The application of such principles has obscured
the fact that women are, in reality, differently situated from men in
that they are statistically less able to command high or even adequate
wages for the reasons outlined above.
No doubt, these were not consequences which the members of
the Commission expected. With the benefit of experience, hindsight,
and the leaps and bounds made in the last twenty years in feminist
social and legal theory, these results are more easily predictable now
than they would have been in 1970. Nevertheless, it is not unfair to
suggest that a theoretical structure and an analysis of the family which
took more careful account of the complexity and specificity of women's
oppression within the family, as well as the contradictory and ideological nature of law, might have yielded more useful recommendations.
Most significantly, the REPORT's acceptance of normative descriptions
of the family as prescriptive blocked a more critical posture which
might have revealed the place of traditional family forms and familial
ideology in the reproduction and reinforcement of women's oppression.
4.

Family Ideology

The concept of familial ideology has been used to explain the
ways in which normative descriptions of the family have been defined
and perpetuated. By appealing to "common sense" and to views of
the "natural" tendencies of human beings to seek the fulfillment of
emotional needs and childbearing and rearing functions within the
nuclear family configuration, the legal system and other social institutions (including the Commission) have contributed to the production
of dominant familial ideology. These systems of ideas tend "to assert
[their] own completeness and timeliness ...maintained by emotional

commitments which may justify selective consideration of empirical
evidence". 0 6 It has been pointed out that such ideologies have a certain
"elasticity" which make them seem to be the product of an individual's
own mind and experience, with a concomitant "generality" which
enables them to remain "a reservoir of belief throughout society and

105 See, e.g., Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801, 7 R.EL. (3d) 225; Caron
v. Caron, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892, 7 R.FL. (3d) 274; Richardson v. Richardson, [1987]
1 S.C.R. 857, 7 R.EL. (3d) 304.

106 S.

Gavigan, Law, Gender and Ideology in A. Bayefsky, ed., LEGAL THEORY
(Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988) 283.

MEETS LEGAL PRACTICE

While it is believed that family relations meet people's needs for love and intimacy,
nevertheless, the family is and has been a site of frequent physical and sexual violence
and psychological abuse, particularly for women and children. Though statistics
regarding the incidence of "family violence" belie descriptions of the idealized family,
yet the power of idealized images frequently results in disbelief in factual evidence.
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[to] flow into the gaps made by individual acts of protest". 107 Thus,
"real" emotional, economic and social needs of individuals are reflected in familial ideologies which at the same time operate to obscure
the ways in which "real" families often fail to meet these needs. Such
ideologies both reproduce and reinforce the sexual division of labour
and resulting patterns of women's social and economic inequality.
Feminist studies of law as it relates to the family have increasingly
attempted to take into account the ways in which familial ideologies
have influenced the shape of legislation and of social policyOs and
have pointed out that such ideologies have obscured the ways in which
people actually shape and organize their social and personal lives. In
this analysis, law (both through legislation and judicial interpretation
and decision-making) is implicated as well in reproducing and reinforcing familial ideologies. Through an examination of "the subtle
processes ...by which legal doctrine, and judicial interpretation and

decision-making" 10 9 contribute to women's subordination, feminists
have been able to indicate both the limits of law for achieving social
change and its potential transformative capacities. 10 Socialist feminist

theories of women's oppression and law have attempted to identify the
links between familial ideologies and women's material reality through
an examination of women's role in the relations of production and
reproduction under capitalism as well as through analysis of the
ideologies linked to such relations., For example, Boyd has pointed
out that "many aspects of family ...legislation can be understood in

terms of the mediation, coordination and balancing of productive and
reproductive relations in society".112 It has been proposed as well that
reforms in family law over the past century represent the efforts of
the state "to maintain and enforce, where necessary, the privatization
of the costs of reproduction '113 in the face of the declining ability of
the traditional family patriarch to control the resources necessary to
ensure the survival of his family. In making women the juridical equals
of men and in the enactment of legislation which provides inadequately
for "dependent" women and children, the state has not alleviated the

107

D. Hay, Property,Authority and the Criminal Law in D. Hay et al., eds,

ALBIONS'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

(New York: Pantheon, 1975) 17 at 55.
108See, e.g., S.B. Boyd, Child Custody, Ideologies and Employment (1989) 3

C.J.W.L. 111 especially at 113-14 and n. 15.
109

Gavigan, supra, note 106 at 293-94.

110See, e.g., Gavigan, ibid.; Boyd, supra, notes

M See, e.g., M. Barrett,

101 and 108.

WOMEN'S OPPRESSION TODAY: THE MARXIST/FEMI-

NIST ENCOUNTER (London: Verso, 1988).
112Boyd, supra, note 101 at 127.

13 J. Ursel, The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy: A Case Study of
Family, Labour and Welfare Legislation in Canada in J. Dickinson & R. Russell,
eds, FAMILY, ECONOMY AND STATE: THE SOCIAL REPRODUCTION PROCESS UNDER
CAPITALISM (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1986) 150 at 177.
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social structural inequalities which relate to women's subordination.
Higher child support awards and strict enforcement procedures are
proposed as the solutions to the feminization of poverty rather than
the provision of adequate welfare benefits, a guaranteed annual income
or proactive employment measures which would change the structure
of the Canadian labour force.
Yet, women's relation to law and the state is not so simple. For,
while legislation has controlled and regulated reproduction, women's
sexual behaviour and the care of children, and welfare legislation has
reproduced and reinforced women's dependence on men, nevertheless,
women have sought and obtained state intervention to control the
violence of men within their households;" 4 to ameliorate conditions of
poverty and provide for the subsistence of themselves and their children
through the provision of welfare" 5 and the enforcement of men's
maintenance obligations,11 6 and to take control over the conditions of
reproduction." 7 Hence, the very unevenness of result which characterizes the engagement of the women's movement with social change
through legislation provides evidence of the complex and contradictory
response of law to women's demands. Law may then be seen as a
potential site of struggle for the fulfilment of those demands, yet in a
much more limited way than that envisaged by the Commission.
The identification of such potential with respect to certain issues
remains, of course, a difficult task and is dependent on a clear
theoretical framework for analyzing the specific nature of women's
inequality and the formulation of concrete political goals which recognize identified limits. In its understanding of the implications of
women's role in the family and of the role of the "traditional" family
and familial ideology in the reproduction of women's oppression, the
REPORT fell seriously short of the mark. The Commission itself fell
prey to the ideological positions of social scientists who, though at
times critical of the effects of modem family life, nevertheless clung
to the belief that the family must survive, "as they 'know of no people
who have succeeded for long in dissolving the family or replacing
it"'. 1s The REPORT did note that "the Women's Liberation Movement,
the New Feminists and other similar groups"" 9 viewed the family as
"an unjust and outdated arrangement for modem human beings",20

"4 As a result of women's activism, many provinces have acted to encourage
the arrest and prosecution of men who assault their partners.
"1 See, e.g., L. Gordon, What Does Welfare Regulate? (1988) 55 Soc.
RESEARCH 609.
116 See, e.g., Ursel, supra, note 113.
117See, e.g., S. Gavigan, On "Bringing on the Menses": The Criminal Liability
of Women and the Therapeutic Exception in Canadian Abortion Law (1986) 1
C.J.W.L. 279.
118 REPORT, supra, note 2 at 226.

119Ibid.
120

Ibid.
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and further, that feminists such as Margaret Benston had identified
"the complete breakdown of the present nuclear family"' 2' as a concomitant of the structural changes necessary for the "liberation of
women". 122 Yet it rejected the profoundly critical stance toward the
family which might have resulted in a more clear understanding of the
role of the family in the oppression of women, the need for fundamental structural change for achieving equality goals, as well as the
uneven potential of law for securing such aims.
IV. WOMEN, POVERTY AND THE FAMILY: THE PAST
AS PROLOGUE?

As this analysis demonstrates, a current assessment of the recommendations of the Royal Commission REPORT must take account of
more recent challenges to our fundamental understanding of the structure of poverty and the ideology of family. In doing so, the connections
between women's labour force activity and economic insecurity are
better revealed, along with the ways in which roles are shaped and
defined for men and women within marriage and in relation to parenting
responsibilities. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems inevitable that
we are critical of the REPORT's acceptance of equality of opportunity
goals and its failure to appreciate, and to challenge, the constraints of
the nuclear family in terms of real choices for women.
Perhaps more significantly, the REPORT'S formal separation of
issues of poverty and of family in relation to Canadian women masked
the connections between them; connections which have only increased
in the twenty years after the REPORT. In research studies conducted
both in Canada 23 and elsewhere, 2 4 the poverty experienced by women
(and children) at marriage breakdown, in stark contrast to the relative
affluence of men, has been documented repeatedly. As marriages end
and families are "reconstituted" in great numbers, the alleviation of
women's (and children's) poverty is eliminated only by (re)marriage.
Thus, just as marriage masks women's economic insecurity while
divorce reveals it more plainly, the connections between poverty and
family create demonstrable challenges for ideas of gender equality
which take economic security into account. As Isabel Marcus has
suggested, the social construction of gender roles has been reflected in
all legal reforms concerning marriage and divorce. Indeed, in her view,

121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.

123 See M.L. McCall, J.P. Hornick & J.E. Wallace, THE PROCESS AND EcoNOMIC CONSEQUENCES

OF MARRIAGE

Institute for Law and the Family, 1988).
124 See supra, note 27.

BREAKDOWN

(Calgary: Canadian Research
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"[g]ender free or even gender neutral divorce law in a gendered society
is an oxymoron."' 125 On this basis, the pessimistic conclusion for the
1990s is that poverty and family are unified issues for women, not
separate and discrete chapters as the REPORT characterized them.
Yet, even as we are critical of the REPORT'S analytical framework
and the limits of the principles it adopted, we must also recognize the
significant contribution of the REPORT, in its own time, as part of the
process of reconceptualizing both our objectives and the means of
achieving them. In beginning to identify the problems and in attempting
to articulate solutions, the REPORT made a significant impact on ideas
about women, family and poverty in ways which have enabled us to
search for better solutions and more useful means ever since. As Gerda
Lerner suggested in the context of feminist history:
[I]n preserving the collective past and re-interpreting it to the present,
human beings define their potential and explore the limits of their
possibilities. We learn from the past not only what people before us did
126
and thought and intended; we also learn how they failed and erred.

Yet, what of the future? In the context of our critique of law and
its limits in relation to poor women, it is necessary for us to devise
legal strategies which are connected to efforts to accomplish social
change, and to avoid thinking of law as the only, or even the most
useful tool, for challenging the status quo. 27 As well, in the context
of our critique of family ideology, we must reconceptualize our ideas
of individualism and community, and both recognize and articulate the
ways in which family structures impact differently on women and men
in terms of their roles as individuals and within communities. 128 In
doing so, we are engaged in nothing less than a fundamental restructuring of law and gender and redefining both our objectives and
ourselves.
In such a reconceptualizing, Susan Moller Okin has recently
suggested that the family needs to be a "just institution" and that we
need to address ourselves to new theories of justice which no longer
"neglect women and ignore gender".129 Ironically, almost twenty years
125 I. Marcus, Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce
Law Reform in New York (1987) 42 U. MIAMI L.R. 55. See also M. Fineman,
Implementing Equality, Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of
Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce [1983] Wisc.

L. REv. 789.

126 THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY

at 221.
127

See, e.g., C. Smart,

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)

FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW

(London: Rou-

tledge, 1989).
128 See, e.g., M.J. Mossman, Individualism and Community: Family as a
Mediating Concept in A.C. Hutchinson & L. Green, eds, LAW AND COMMUNITY:
THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM

(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 205.

129 JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE

FAMILY (New York: Basic Books, 1989) at 170-
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after the Royal Commission REPORT, and in spite of many changes in
our ideas about women, family and poverty over time, such an
aspiration is very similar to that proposed by the REPORT'S reforms in
1970: "no more than simple justice". In this respect, the REPORT'S
aspiration is the same as ours. What is different may be our recognition
that justice for women is not so simple after all.

